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We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false be-
lief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants
attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly
worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterll and Apperly’s (2013) “min-
imal theory of mind” framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the
minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social
situations in terms of states of an enduring mental substance animating agents, in-
fant interpreters parse observed bouts of behavior and their contexts into goals,
rational means to those goals, and available information. In other words, the social
ontology of infant interpreters consists in goal-directed, (mis- or un-) informed
bouts of behavior, by non-enduring agents, rather than agents animated by states of
enduring, unobservable minds. We discuss a number of experiments that support
this interpretation of infant socio-cognitive competence.
Keywords: mindreading, social cognition, action prediction, false belief, cognitive
development
1. Introduction
In the wake of a urry of recent experimental results in developmental psy-
chology, there is currently a vibrant debate about how to characterize the so-
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cial cognition of pre-verbal infants in the second year of life.1 Since the ear-
liest research on elicited false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Wimmer
and Perner 1983), it had been thought that children do not attribute repre-
sentationalmental states to others until age four (Wellman et al. 2001).ese
sorts of experiments can be run only on verbal children, since they involve
asking subjects about agents’ mental states or future behaviors. However,
primarily employing a violation-of-expectations looking-time paradigm,
more recent experiments have shown that infants spontaneously look longer,
andhence showgreater surprise, when anuninformedormisinformed agent
acts in an informed manner than when she acts in an uninformed or mis-
informed manner, and when an informed agent acts in an uninformed or
misinformed manner than when she acts in an informed manner (Onishi
and Baillargeon 2005; see Baillargeon et al. 2010, for a review).
is very robust pattern of apparently inconsistent results has provoked
a spectrum of theoretical responses. At one extreme, many of the pioneers
of the spontaneous response paradigm argue that it shows that, by early in
the second year of life, human infants are deploying the same concepts of
mental states, including preferences and false beliefs, to interpret behavior,
as older children who pass the elicited response tasks aer age four (Luo and
Baillargeon 2010). e lag in passing elicited response versions of the false
belief task is attributed to immature domain-general capacities, like working
memory, attention, and response inhibition (Scott and Baillargeon 2009), or
to immature linguistic capacities aecting children’s interpretations of verbal
requests for behavioral predictions or mental state attributions (Carruthers
2013; Helming et al. 2016). At the other extreme, some theorists argue that
infant behavior on spontaneous response false belief tasks is absolutely no
evidence for an early developing, specically socio-cognitive capacity. Infant
responses can be explained entirely in terms of associations between agents
and locations or objects (Ruman 2014; Ruman and Perner 2005). Finally,
some theorists argue for a compromise position: infant behavior in sponta-
neous response false belief tasks is evidence for a dedicated socio-cognitive
capacity, but not the same socio-cognitive capacity as four-year-old children
deploy when they pass elicited response false belief tasks. Spontaneous re-
sponse false belief tasks trigger a “minimal theory of mind” which, although
it involves the deployment of a type of mental state concept, does not in-
volve the deployment of fully meta-representational mental state concepts,
1 Marco Fenici wrote section 1; Tad Zawidzki wrote section 2. Sections 3, 4, and the Con-
clusions were written by both of the authors together.
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of the kind deployed by four-year-olds in elicited response false belief tasks
(Apperly and Butterll 2009; Butterll and Apperly 2013).2
Close attention to, and careful reection on the infant data are essential
to choosing between these dierent proposals. On the one hand, no one as-
sumes that infants must be able to display belief-tracking capacities in every
interpretive context.us, their apparent absence in some experimental sit-
uations does not directly settle whether this is caused by competence as op-
posed to performance limitations (Bloom and German 2000; Fodor 1992).
On the other hand, because intentional action manifests itself in observable
physical behavior, it is always possible to interpret apparent manifestations
of infant belief-tracking capacities as evidence for either mentalist or behav-
iorist interpretive capacities (Buckner 2014; Hutto 2015; Povinelli and Vonk
2004). Resolving this debate thus requires dening a precise criterion to
indicate what socio-cognitive capacities infants display in particular exper-
imental contexts (Fenici 2015, 390–392).
Below, we focus on Butterll and Apperly’s (2013) “minimal theory of
mind” proposal because of its admirable clarity in identifying empirically
determinable “signature limits” meant to distinguish infant mindread-
ing from full-blown, meta-representational theory of mind. According to
Butterll and Apperly, rather than attributing fully representational beliefs
and preferences to agents, infant interpreters attribute goals, encounterings,
and registrations. Roughly, the goals of behaviors displayed in infant ex-
periments are fully public states of aairs that agent behavior brings about.
Encounterings are transparent relations between agents and worldly states,
like lines of sight on objects at locations. Registrations derive from encoun-
terings: an agent who has encountered object O at L, will register this infor-
mation, and continue to be guided by it in the absence of a new, incompat-
ible encountering, e.g., line of sight on O at L′. Since registrations can be
insensitive to changes in situations, e.g., when something happens while the
agent is not looking, agents guided by registrations can behave in ways that
make sense only relative to non-actual situations. us, the attribution of
registrations enables infant interpreters to exhibit behavior that is typically
2 Heyes (2014) argues for a fourth possibility: that infants’ selective attention in spontaneous
response false belief tasks can be explained by the operation of domain general processes,
and depends on the novelty of low-level features of the scenes presented to infant subjects,
such as colors, shapes, and movements. We similarly believe that domain general learn-
ing may underlie infants’ progressively rened sensitivity to other agents’ goal-directed
behavior (see Fenici 2014). In contrast to Heyes (2014), however, we propose that infants’
learning progressively comes to focus on the domain of specically goal-directed behavior.
us, unlikeHeyes’ view, our view does not depend on dismissing this whole experimental
paradigm, on the basis of alleged experimental confounds.
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diagnostic of false belief attribution, without attributing full-blown false be-
liefs.
One of the key signature limits that Butterll and Apperly identify for
social cognition guided by minimal theory of mind involves opacity: they
conjecture that infants employing only minimal theory of mind will not be
able to track dierences in the modes of presentation with which dierent
agents track the same objects. Since the minimal mindreading analog of
false belief, i.e., registration, is a transparent relation between an agent and
an object at a location, infants should show no sensitivity to dierences in
the appearances by which dierent agents track the same objects.
Another signature limit involves holism: there should be limits to the
degree of inferential “promiscuity” that infants employing minimal theory
of mind associate with the states they attribute. Full-blown mental states
can, in principle, interact with whole systems of other mental states, as well
as a wide variety of inputs (dierent sense modalities, verbal interactions),
yielding dierent behaviors as a result of dierent interactions.ere seems
to be no limit to such potential inferential promiscuity, especially with some
categories ofmental states, like the propositional attitudes. But, according to
Butterll andApperly, this is not the case for the states attributed byminimal
mind readers, like “registrations” and “goals.” Although registrations and
goals can interact with some exibility, i.e., the same registrations will yield
dierent behaviors depending on goals, and vice versa, there are important
limits to this.
Butterll and Apperly’s signature limits to minimal theory of mind thus
imply specic predictions about how infants will perform on spontaneous
response tasks. ere are already experimental paradigms exploring this
question. Specically, there is evidence that infant social cognition is bound
by Butterll and Apperly’s rst signature limit, a failure to appreciate opac-
ity (Low and Watts 2013). In contrast, there seems to be strong evidence
that infant interpreters are not bound by the second signature limit: they
seem surprisingly exible in the degree of inferential promiscuity they asso-
ciate with the mental states they attribute. For example, they seem capable
of linking specic beliefs with an indenite variety of perceptions originated
through dierent modalities, including sight (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005;
Southgate et al. 2007), touch (Träuble et al. 2010), and verbalized informa-
tion (Song et al. 2008).
While these studies address some issues relevant to the interpretation
of infant social cognition, we believe that the evidence they provide is not
enough to show that preverbal infants deploy any kind of mental state con-
cept when they pass spontaneous response versions of false belief tasks. In
particular, there is a feature ofmaturemental state concepts that has received
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very little attention in the experimental literature, yet which there are good
empirical reasons to doubt infants appreciate. is is the fact that mature
concepts of mental states are concepts of states. At a minimum, a state must
be one of a number of alternative possible states into which some endur-
ing object can enter. Presumably, the relevant object for mental states is an
agent’smind, where this is understood as an unobservable, enduring, causal
nexus, responsible for observable behavior.
In what follows, we argue that none of the evidence from spontaneous
response false belief tasks with preverbal infants shows that infants conceive
of agents as animated by enduring, unobservableminds, of which the beliefs
and preferences they allegedly attribute are supposed to be states. Further-
more, we argue that there is evidence that they do not conceive of agents
in this way, i.e., as animated by minds which can enter dierent kinds of
causally potent states, like beliefs and preferences.
How else might infants conceive their social world if not in terms of an
ontology of agents animated by enduring minds that enter dierent kinds of
mental states? Here is another possibility. Perhaps infant interpreters em-
ploy an ontology of disjoint, temporally limited and isolated bouts of behav-
ior. ese bouts of behavior can have dierent goals, and can be informed,
uninformed, or misinformed. But, we want to suggest, there is no evidence
that infants represent them as causal consequences of states of an unobserv-
able, enduring mental substance, animating individual agents. Infants sim-
ply parse observable bouts of behavior and their spatiotemporally limited
contexts into obvious goals, rational means to those goals, and available in-
formation, predicting their future trajectories based on these attributed re-
lational properties. is should be enough to explain their capacity to dis-
tinguish between the future courses of informed, misinformed, and unin-
formed behaviors, without assuming that they deploy mature concepts of
mental states.
Below, we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide more detailed
characterizations of the central concepts we claim infants deploy, especially
the concept of a goal-directed bout of behavior that can be informed, unin-
formed, or misinformed. In Section 3 we review positive, existing evidence
that infant social cognition, as measured via spontaneous response tasks,
shows precisely the signature limits one would expect, if they operate with
an ontology of disjoint, spatiotemporally limited, (un- or mis-) informed,
goal-directed bouts of behavior, rather than an ontology of agents animated
by states of enduring mental substances. Section 4 discusses the question of
whether there is a way of experimentally resolving this disagreement about
the social ontology of preverbal infants.
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2. e goal directedness and informedness of bouts of behavior
Most discussion of social cognition makes a tacit assumption: behavioral
anticipation is based either on the attribution of mental states, or on ex-
trapolation from concrete, observable behaviors. Since the latter disjunct is
highly implausible, given the variety of observable behaviors that appear to
yield similar predictions, and the variety of predictions that appear to draw
on similar observable behaviors, most conclude that the social cognition of
human adults and infants, as well as of many nonhuman species, must be
mentalistic. But this, we submit, is based on a false dilemma: there are op-
tions other than behaviorism andmentalism in interpreting socio-cognitive
capacities, specically, those revealed in the infant data. In this section, we
clarify what we mean when we say infants conceptualize bouts of behavior
as goal directed and (mis- or un-) informed, yet not as caused by beliefs and
preferences.
Consider rst what it is for a behavior B to have goal G. Of course, this
cannot be equivalent to some concrete, observable, intrinsic property of B,
since an indenite variety of behaviors can all have goal G. However, it does
not follow that it must be equivalent to possessing a mentalistic etiology,
i.e., roughly, being caused by an unobservable representation of G. Aer all,
having a goal is not equivalent to representing that one has a goal.
Here is an alternative: to say that B has G as its goal is to say that, of all
relevant, observable alternatives in this context, B is themost ecientmeans
of bringing about G.is way of understanding what it is for a behavior to
have a goal is abstract without beingmentalistic—as also claimed byGergely
and Csibra, the rst advocates of this form of “teleological stance” (Csibra
et al. 1999; Csibra et al. 2003; Gergely andCsibra 2003). An indenite variety
of behaviors that dier in their intrinsic, observable properties, can all share
the relational property of having G as their goal, in this sense, because, in
dierent contexts, dierent behaviors will count as the most ecient means
of bringing about G.
Signicantly, infants can predict the future course of observed behav-
ior by interpreting it in this non-mentalistic way. It would be sucient for
them to generate candidate observable goals for an observed behavior, and
select as the goal of the behavior the one relative to which the behavior ap-
pears to be the most ecient means. For instance, infants may evaluate the
most ecient means of accomplishing various goals by detecting the sta-
tistical frequency of dierent observed patterns of behavior as well as by
exploiting the background knowledge they have acquired from experience
of acting directly (Fenici 2014; Fenici and Carpendale submitted; Ruman
2014); or they may simply run their own planning systems o line, and use
the generated behavioral predictions to anticipate interpretive targets’ future
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behaviors (Nichols and Stich 2003).is is not equivalent to attributing rep-
resentations of goals, or simulating interpretive targets’ mental states. Infant
interpreters need not think of themselves as accessing their own planning
system or background information, and then projecting representations of
goals they generate onto the minds of interpretive targets.
Consider now how one can represent a bout of behavior as informed,
or uninformed, or misinformed, without conceiving of it as caused by a
(mis-) representation of some situation.is appears to bemore challenging
than characterizing goal-directedness non-mentalistically. Indeed, infants’
apparent sensitivity to the fact that behaviors can be misinformed is the rea-
son why many are inclined towards a mentalist interpretation of the data.
In fact, even advocates of minimalist interpretations, like Butterll and Ap-
perly, assume that when an infant interpreter predicts that an agent A will
not take into account the fact that an object O has been moved from L to L′
without its knowing, she must be attributing an intervening variable as the
cause of this misinformed behavior.is assumption appears justied, since
the state to which the infant appeals in predicting A’s misinformed behavior,
i.e., O’s presence at L, no longer obtains; so, that state cannot be what the in-
fant has in mind when predicting the target’s current behavior. Rather, the
infant must be attributing to A the registration that O is at L, an unobserv-
able, intervening variable that causes A’s behavior.is qualies the infant’s
interpretation as mentalistic, and is the reason why Butterll and Apperly
call their minimalist interpretation of infant competence, a minimal theory
ofmind.
It is unclear, however, why the case of misinformed behavior should be
any dierent from the case of any other kind of goal-directed behavior. All
goal-directed behavior is predicted on the basis of a non-actual state: goal
G does not obtain yet; so, G cannot help predict A’s behavior. erefore,
the reason for thinking that misinformed behavior requires the attribution
of an intervening, mentalistic cause, i.e., the interpretive target’s behavior
is sensitive to a non-actual situation, equally supports the claim that any
goal-directed behavior requires the attribution of an intervening, mentalis-
tic cause. But the latter seems neither plausible nor necessary. It is prima
facie implausible, given how early in development infants seem sensitive to
the goals of behaviors, and how widespread such sensitivity is among non-
human species. More signicantly, it is also unnecessary: given our earlier,
non-mentalistic characterization of what it is for behavior B to have G as
its goal, it is clear that this can be conceptualized without the attribution of
an intervening, mentalistic cause. Similarly, neither Butterll and Apperly
(2013), nor Gergely and Csibra (2003) have ever claimed that all sensitivity
to goal-directed behavior requires the attribution of such intervening vari-
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ables. erefore, just as the sensitivity to non-actual states of goal-directed
behavior need not imply that successful prediction of such behavior requires
the attribution of intervening states, it is possible that the sensitivity to non-
actual states ofmisinformed behavior likewise need not imply this.
Here is our non-mentalistic explanation of the infant capacity to predict
misinformed behavior. Suppose infants begin with the teleological stance:
they expect agent behaviors to constitute the most ecient means to goals
among alternatives available in context. ese expectations will oen be
confuted, due to mismatches between the background assumptions of in-
fant interpreters and agents they interpret. Sometimes agents will have non-
obvious goals, which infant interpreters will not even consider as possible
candidates to be weeded out using the “ecient means” heuristic. Some-
times agents will have dierent background knowledge about how to accom-
plish goals, and hence make dierent assumptions about which behavior is
the most ecient means. Signicantly, sometimes agents will also have ac-
cess to dierent information about the layout of objects in the environment,
with implications for which behaviors are the most ecient means to some
goal.
Given the drive to minimize prediction errors, infant interpreters will
notice behavioral and situational invariants that accompany such errors. For
example, they might notice early on that interpretive targets with no line
of sight on the displacement of an object relevant to some goal will subse-
quently fail to pick themost ecient behavioral means to that goal. Further-
more, they might notice that the behavior such an interpretive target picks
remains the most ecient means to the goal relative to the object position
on which the target last had a line of sight, prior to displacement.
If this captures infant socio-cognitive development, it makes possible
non-mentalistic characterizations of informed, uninformed, and misin-
formed behaviors. Suppose that infant interpreters assume the following.
Behavior B, with goal G, is informed by situation S just in case B constitutes
the most ecient means to G only relative to S. To know by which S B is
informed, infants must simply monitor the epistemically relevant environ-
mental relations of whichever agent, A, performs B. For example, suppose B,
performed byA, is themost ecientmeans toG only relative to the situation
S, in which object O is at L. If O remains at L throughout, and A has a con-
stant, direct line of sight on O, the infant interpreter will predict that B will
be informed by S, and successfully achieve G. In contrast, if O ismoved from
L, yielding a new situation, S′, and A does not have a constant direct line of
sight on O, the infant interpreter might predict that B will be uninformed,
i.e., insensitive to S′, and hence, fail to accomplish G.
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Or, perhaps the infant interpreter ismore sophisticated. Perhaps she will
assume that B ismisinformed by situation S, i.e., O at L, in which A last had
a line of sight on O. In that case, the infant will predict that B will constitute
the most ecient means to G relative to (the now anachronistic) S.is is
the sort of case that is typically used to diagnose the presence of the false
belief concept. However, we see here that such cases need not imply an un-
derstanding of false belief, understood as a mental state, of some unobserv-
able causal nexus, responsible for the behavior. Instead, infant interpreters
might just tag a behavior as misinformed based on the fact that its agent
lacked epistemic access to recent alterations relevant to the behavior’s goal.
To sum up: nothing in the available empirical data demonstrates that
infants’ interpretations of intentional action require them to attribute repre-
sentations of goals, as opposed to generating candidate observable goals for
an observed behavior, and selecting as the goal of the behavior the one rel-
ative to which the behavior appears to be the most ecient means—that is,
applying the teleological stance to the observed behavior. Similarly, nothing
in the empirical data compels the conclusion that infants attribute interven-
ing mental states in spontaneous response false belief tasks. Rather, infants
may simply notice that agents with no line of sight on, or other observable
epistemic access to the displacement of an object relevant to some goal, will
subsequently select the most ecient means to the goal relative to the object
position of which they were last informed, prior to displacement.
3. Assessing the empirical evidence
Above, we have introduced what we may call a minimal theory of rational
agency, according to which infants form expectations about others’ behav-
ior by tracking the goals of disjoint, temporally limited and isolated bouts
of behavior, and also paying attention to short-lived behavioral and situa-
tional invariants aecting whether or not such behaviors are appropriately
informed. We now discuss how we might experimentally establish whether
or not an infant interpreter is operating with such concepts of goal-directed,
(mis- or un-) informed behaviors, rather than with concepts of enduring
minds that enter states of belief and preference.
We rst note that even some of the most persuasive experimental evi-
dence in favor of preverbal infantmastery ofmental state concepts is equally
compatible with our view that infant interpreters conceptualize their social
worlds only in terms of goal directed and (un- or mis-) informed bouts of
behavior. Consider, for example, Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) experiment
with two toy penguins. One penguin comes in two pieces, but can be as-
sembled to look like the other, one-piece penguin. e goal of the agent
infants interpret is to place a key in the two-piece penguin.e agent comes
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upon the following scene, which the infant has just observed being set up:
the two-piece penguin assembled to look like the one-piece penguin under a
transparent cover, and the one-piece penguin hiddenunder an opaque cover.
Based on looking time, Scott & Baillargeon conclude that infants expect
the agent to search for the two-piece penguin where the one-piece penguin
is, under the opaque cover, despite the fact that infants know the two-piece
penguin to be under the transparent cover. e reason they give is that in-
fants attribute to the agent the false belief that the penguin under the trans-
parent cover is the one-piece penguin, since the agent did not see the two-
piece penguin assembled to look like the one-piece penguin, as the infants
did.
e problem with this interpretation is that, during familiarization tri-
als, infants witness the agent, herself, assembling the two-piece penguin to
look like the one-piece penguin. So they should attribute to the agent the
belief that the two-piece penguin can be made to look like the one-piece
penguin. But during the test trials infant interpreters completely fail to take
this into account. is would be puzzling if they conceived of the agent as
animated by an enduring mind, of which beliefs are potentially enduring
states (Zawidzki 2011). Why would they ignore the extremely relevant fact
that the agent’s mind should be in the state of believing that the two-piece
penguin can be assembled to look like the one-piece penguin?
If, however, these infants are employing a minimal theory of rational
agency, in the sense described above, then this result is unsurprising. e
infants do not think of their interpretive target as an agent animated by an
enduring mind that enters dierent mental states of varying durations that
are causally responsible for behavior. Rather, they think of their interpretive
target as a bout of goal-directed behavior by a non-enduring agent, limited to
the current spatiotemporal context, with certain relevant, transparent, and
transient epistemic relations to present objects, like the two-piece penguin.
Since this non-enduring agent fails to have direct line of sight on a relevant
manipulation of the two-piece penguin, e.g., its assembly, and has a line of
sight only on the assembled two-piece penguin, which looks one-piece, the
infants conclude that the agent’s goal-directed behaviorwill bemisinformed.
In order to mount a general challenge to mentalist accounts of socio-
cognitive capacities in infancy, we contrast our view with Butterll and Ap-
perly’s (2013) account, which constitutes the most minimalist proposal still
endorsing a mentalist interpretation of the data. On a rst reading our pro-
posal might seem very similar to theirs, which also explains infants’ capacity
to predict misinformed behavior in terms of their understanding of how sit-
uational invariants (e.g., the presence of barriers on line of sight between
an agent and a possible target of action) may aect infants’ habitual expec-
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tations about the future behavior of other agents. e dierence between
these two accounts, however, concerns their explanations of how infants
form such expectations. Butterll and Apperly are explicit that infant at-
tributions of registrations count as attributions of mental states to agents, in
virtue of the fact that registrations are intervening causal variables.3 On our
interpretation, in contrast, there is no attribution of an intervening causal
variable to an agent. Rather, infants are attributing a relation between a bout
of behavior and a (possibly non-actual) public situation—an attribution that
can be updated when the infant notices specic situational invariants.
Moreover, we highlight a dierence between the signature limits that
Butterll and Apperly identify for their minimal theory of mind, and the
signature limits on our minimal theory of rational agency. e signature
limits on a minimal theory of rational agency are supposed to distinguish
not between the semantic properties of the states that infant and older inter-
preters attribute, as do Butterll and Apperly’s signature limits, but rather,
between the respective social ontologies of infants and older interpreters.
Adult human interpreters operating with a theory of mind conceive of the
social world in terms of enduring agents animated by unobservable, endur-
ing minds, states of which, like beliefs and preferences, are causally respon-
sible for agent behaviors. On our view, instead, infant interpreters oper-
ating only with a minimal theory of rational agency conceive of the social
world in terms of bouts of behavior with goals, performed by non-enduring
agents that enter into an open-ended range of short-lived epistemic rela-
tions to items in environmental contexts the infants share with these agents.
ese short-lived epistemic relations determine whether or not the agents’
behaviors are appropriately informed.
Given this way of distinguishing between infant and later interpretive
competence, we should expect the following sorts of signature limits. (1) In-
fant interpreters should show no sensitivity to the eects on goal-directed
behavior of suciently dated information, i.e., information that is not, in
some sense, a component of the current interaction between the infant and
the agent.4 e reasoning here is that the only way to take such dated infor-
3 “[T]heory of mind cognition begins when subjects ascribe states which function as vari-
ables intervening between environmental or behavioral inputs and behavioral outputs, and
which play some roles characteristic of mental states (Whiten 1996; Penn and Povinelli
2007, 732). On this denition, the endpoint in our construction (but no earlier point) does
count as theory of mind cognition because registrations are intermediate variables and play
a subset of the causal roles characteristic of belief ” (Butterll and Apperly 2013, 621, em-
phasis added).
4 We acknowledge that the notion of more or less dated information that may or may not
be a component of an interaction is vague. However, this vagueness can be reduced by
attending to the details of relevant experiments. For example, as we make clear in our dis-
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mation into account is to conceive of the agent as animated by an enduring,
unobservable mind, states of which causally explain the agent’s sensitivity to
spatiotemporally displaced situations. (2) Infant interpreters should be bad
at binding goal-directedness and informedness to particular agents, since
they do not conceive of these as products of causally potent states of endur-
ing, unobservable minds within particular agents.
In fact, there is good evidence that infant interpretation is bound by
these signature limits. Recent evidence from elicited-response, location
change, “Sally-Anne” false belief tasks supports the rst signature limit on
infant sensitivity to relevant but dated information. Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts (2013) analyzed the impact of two modications to the traditional
experimental setting on children’s capacity to succeed in the task. First, they
required children to act out the end of the story with the puppets that the ex-
perimenter already used to tell it, rather than asking them the nal question
about where Sally would look for the ball. Moreover, they also manipulated
whether, at the point of the story when the main character leaves, the exper-
imenter made her disappear completely by dropping the puppet under the
table, thereby putting it out of the child’s sight, or retained her on the scene
with back turned.ey found that even three-and-half-year-olds succeeded
on the task when it was modied in bothways. In contrast, their success was
below chance if either of the two modications was not included.
It is known that the rst modication, i.e., acting out the end of the story
using the puppets rather than responding to a question, facilitates children’s
success in elicited response false belief tasks (Wellman et al. 2001), for at least
two reasons. First, it increases children’s engagement with the story, thereby
enhancing their attention to the mental states of the characters involved—in
particular, to the fact that Sally no longer knows where the ball is (Fenici
submitted). Moreover, it removes a factor—i.e., mentioning the ball in the
nal question—that has been demonstrated to interfere with both children’s
(Rubio-Fernández andGeurts 2016) and even adults’ (Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts 2013) performance in the task.
e secondmodication is more crucial. If infants merely track bouts of
behavior rather than the enduringmental states of other agents, theymay fail
to consider the persistence of the mental states of an agent who disappears
from a scene, especially in social situations, like the experimental setting
of the original elicited response false belief task, that pose signicant lin-
guistic demands. By eliminating the nal verbal question, Rubio-Fernández
and Geurts’ rst modication to the experimental paradigm reduces these
cussion of one such experiment below, infants seem to regard the complete disappearance
of an agent from their sight as a disruption of the interaction, and hence fail to take into
account to what situation the agent had epistemic access prior to its disappearance.
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demands, thereby allowing children to rely on basic socio-cognitive capaci-
ties; presumably the same ones employed by younger infants in spontaneous
false belief tasks. If these basic socio-cognitive capacities are limited to in-
terpreting bouts of behavior by non-enduring agents, it is unsurprising that
children continue to fail at the task when Sally disappears from the scene,
yet succeed when she remains at the scene with back turned. If Sally disap-
pears from the scene, to predict her behavior aer her return, childrenwould
have to attribute mental states that endured while she was out of their sight,
something that violates our rst signature limit on the minimal theory of
rational agency; so, on our view, we should expect children employing this
competence to fail to properly complete Sally’s behavior in this condition.
In contrast, if Sally remains on the scene without an appropriate, observ-
able epistemic relation to a relevant alteration, i.e., the object being hidden,
children need only apply the minimal theory of rational agency to properly
complete Sally’s behavior; they need only conceive of Sally’s behavior asmis-
informed, in the sense we specify above. In our view, this is why three-and-
a-half year old children succeed only with bothmodications of the original
Sally-Anne task: subjects completing puppet behavior rather than respond-
ing to questions, and Sally remaining at the scene with back turned, rather
than disappearing.
Evidence in favor of the second signature limit on the minimal theory
of rational agency, i.e., inability to bind goals and information to particular
agents, comes froman appropriate interpretation of another series of studies.
It is known that infants do not interpret repeated reaching toward a location
as intentional when no contrastive choice is available. For instance, infants
expect an agent who repeatedly grasps or approaches an object to keep look-
ing for that object only if, when the actor initially manifested her preference
for the object, she also had the possibility to select a second object (Luo and
Baillargeon 2005).
Exploiting this fact, Luo (2011; and, similarly, Luo and Baillargeon 2007,
with slightly older infants) showed 10-month-olds an agent pushing an ob-
ject beyond either a transparent or an opaque screen. A hand then appeared
and removed it. is induced a false belief that the object was still there in
the agent in the opaque condition, while in the transparent condition the
agent could still see through the screen that the object was not there any-
more. In both conditions, infants were then familiarized to see the agent
reaching for another toy at a visible location. In the test trials, the position
of the object was switched, and infants saw the agent reaching either for the
old object at the new location or the new object at the old location.
e results showed that infants looked longer, indicating surprise, when
they saw the agent reaching for the new object at the old location in the
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opaque, but not in the transparent, condition. is indicates that they had
formed an expectation about the course of the observed action, and accord-
ingly had interpreted the observed behavior as intentional, only when they
considered that, from the perspective of the agent, there were two objects to
choose between in the familiarization trials. According to Luo, it also sug-
gests that “infants . . . considered the agent’s informational states to decide
whether or not to attribute a preference to her” (Luo 2011, 295).
Subsequent research however challenges this conclusion, and suggests
instead the presence of a signicant signature limit in infants’ alleged capac-
ity to attribute beliefs—a limit predicted by our present proposal. Kampis,
Somogyi, Itakura, and Király (2013) ran the same experiment with a signif-
icant modication: in the test phase, they introduced a second agent who
chose either consistently or inconsistently with the preference previously
displayed by the rst agent. Signicantly, infants expected this second agent
to choose as the rst one, but only in the condition where this latter agent
knew that two objects were present in familiarization.
is result conrms the empirical nding by Luo (2011) but also renes
its signicance. Indeed, if infants are simply tracking bouts of behavior, as
we argued above, this result is exactlywhatwe should expect: our second sig-
nature limit, i.e., infants using a minimal theory of rational action should be
bad at binding goals and information to particular agents, implies that sub-
stituting one agent with another should not aect infant behavioral predic-
tions. If, on the contrary, infants attribute enduring mental states to the rst
agent—as the advocates of mentalist interpretations of infant data argue—
their action prediction capacities should be sensitive to who witnesses an
event. Consequently, it remains a puzzle why they should attribute the very
same mental state to a second agent who has never appeared before.
In light of these considerations, it is surprising that Kampis and col-
leagues maintain a mentalist interpretation of the data, and claim that these
ndings indicate that infants can attribute mental state contents (e.g., the
belief content that there is such-and-such object behind the opaque screen),
but do not bind them to agents. To whom are they attributing mental state
contents?
In order to assess this mentalist interpretation, let us consider Kovács
(2016), which defends a similar claim. Kovács reasons that, if infants at-
tribute mental states such as beliefs, they should be able to individuate the
beliefs they are attributing. However, “it seems that neither the agent nor
the content alone could be sucient to individuate a specic belief .. . .while
. . .belief individuation or belief indexing should rely on a relation between
the belief-holder and the belief-content” (Kovács 2016, 517). She thus intro-
duces a theoretical construct, the “belief le”, to “provide a representational
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structure with variables for (1) the agent, as the belief holder and for (2) the
belief-content, in a way that each can be separately updated” (Kovács 2016,
515) but such that, together, they can be used to individuate a unique belief
attributed to an agent.
Of course, Kovacs’ interpretation is possibly true. We are not claiming
that ours is the only possible interpretation. However, Kovacs’ interpreta-
tion has the disadvantage of claiming that infants attributemental states that
have neither observable contents nor bearers. is is confusing because if
the state has no bearer who might be misinformed about a situation, and it
corresponds to no currently observable situation, what determines its con-
tent? And, furthermore, if it has no bearer, how can it be a mental content?
Our alternative avoids these problems by denying that infants attributemen-
tal contents. Rather, they attribute relations between bouts of behavior and
information, based on observable, epistemic relations, which may involve
agents other than the one currently being predicted. If infants are not at-
tributing mental contents, then it is not strange to think that the epistemic
relations of one temporally limited agent might aect the informedness of
the behavior of a dierent temporally limited agent. It is true that this implies
that infants attribute very complex, distributed, relational properties, e.g., a
bout of behavior being misinformed by a non-actual situation in virtue of
earlier, observable, epistemic relations to that situation when it was actual,
by a dierent agent. But there is no reason to think infants aren’t sensitive to
such complex relational properties.
4. Discussion
While we think the hypothesis that infant interpreters employ a minimal
theory of rational agency is promising, we are well aware that it is always
possible to interpret the evidence discussed above in ways that salvage the
hypothesis that infants attribute mental states. As they typically do in re-
sponse to minimalist alternatives, defenders of this position can appeal to a
strong competence/performance distinction. For example, infantsmight fail
to take into account enduring mental states acquired in circumstances spa-
tiotemporally displaced from the current context because of memory limi-
tations. e idea is that they attribute enduring mental states to targets of
interpretation, but cannot always remember all the mental states they have
attributed. For instance, in Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) penguin experi-
ment, during the familiarization trials, infants attribute to the agent the be-
lief that the two-piece penguin can be assembled to look like the one-piece
penguin, but they forget about this belief by the time they must interpret the
agent during the test trial.
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One problem with this idea is that infants appear to remember from fa-
miliarization that the agent desires to put the key in the two-piece penguin.
So why do they remember one enduringmental state but not another? How-
ever, this enduring desire is a problem for our account as well: does it not
show that infants do assume that some mental states endure?
From our perspective, the dierence between the attribution of endur-
ing goals and enduring belief states can be accommodated as follows. e
infants do not think of the enduring goals as states of an unobservable, en-
during mind that animates the agent; rather, they think of them in norma-
tive, agent-neutral terms: as kinds of behavior in which any agent ought
to engage in the context of the penguin “game.” On this view, rather than
acquainting infant interpreters with the agent’s enduring mental states, fa-
miliarization trials simply specify the rules of the game. is is consistent
with Kampis et al.’s evidence that infants generally attribute goals in an agent
neutral way.
Still, we acknowledge that the evidence seems interpretable either way. It
is compatible with treating infants as scientic psychologists, with concepts
of potentially enduring mental states that are causally responsible for be-
havior, yet with memory limitations. And it is also compatible with treating
infants as detectors and parsers of spatiotemporally limited patterns of ra-
tional, goal-directed, (mis- or un-) informed actions, constrained by norms
about what sorts of goals ought to be pursued in specic contexts.
Although we believe that future research will certainly provide addi-
tional data rening our understanding of both infants’ socio-cognitive ca-
pacities and their limitations, we believe it is unlikely that the choice between
these two alternatives will be settled by empirical research alone.ese two
views on social cognition in infancy derive from more general, alternative
sets of interdependent assumptions belonging to the domain of “metatheo-
ries” rather than “theories” (Overton 2015). On the one hand, the mentalist
interpretation of infants’ social cognition privileges a view ofmental state at-
tribution capacities as extremely important in our social lives, and assumes
that they are underpinned by dedicated neural processes (Saxe et al. 2004;
Saxe andWexler 2005), which develop under the pressure of cognitive mat-
uration, and have been shaped through natural selection because of their
survival value (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Humphrey 1976). In contrast, our
proposal is grounded in the belief that mental state attribution capacities
are not as central to our social lives as advocates of the mentalist interpre-
tation assume. Far from being innately determined, they are progressively
acquired by the child as she is introduced to the social practice of reporting
others’ mental states (Fenici forthcoming), and have evolved as responses
to culturally evolved social practices, relative to which mental state talk was
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relevant to meeting social needs that have existed since the earliest human
communities (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2008; Zawidzki 2013).
e contrast between these two general frameworks makes it unlikely
that empirical evidence from a single experimental paradigm will decide
the issue of which of them provides the more appropriate characterization
of social cognition in infancy. It is more likely that the decision between
such interpretations must be made on a broader, more theoretical basis. We
believe that one important factor in deciding between themmay come from
assessing computational models implementing them (Pfeifer and Bongard
2006). Perhaps it is easier to implement, within a cognitive architecture,
representations and predictions of bouts of goal-directed, (mis- or un-) in-
formed behavior, by spatiotemporally limited agents than representations
of states of enduring, unobservable minds.is might favor our interpreta-
tion. On the other hand, perhaps evidence from experiments involving adult
social cognition will show that adults operate with a unitary socio-cognitive
competence, rather than a hybrid, consisting of aminimal system conserved
from infancy, and a later arriving sophisticated system. If this turns out to be
the case, then it might support the mentalist interpretation of infant compe-
tence. If there is no trace of a distinct, minimal competence in adult social
cognition, perhaps the more parsimonious hypothesis is that infants em-
ploy the same competence as adults, albeit in some attenuated form. Hence,
if adult social cognition essentially involves concepts of mental states, then
so does infant social cognition. In either case, the fact that resolving this
dispute depends on such broad considerations suggests that the nature of
infant social cognition is likely to be contested for a long time.
5. Conclusions
Do infant socio-cognitive abilities manifested in spontaneous response false
belief tasks indicate a capacity to attribute unobservable, enduring mental
states? Challenging a widely shared assumption among cognitive scientists
and developmental psychologists, we have proposed that, rather than at-
tributing mental states to agents they interpret, infants merely track goals
of observed bouts of behavior, as well as the situational invariants aect-
ing whether or not such behaviors are appropriately informed. We believe
that we have provided good reasons to explore alternative ways of inter-
preting the experimental data coming from studies of infant social cogni-
tion, though we have not provided a decisive argument against prevailing
mentalist interpretations. Aer all, the debate between mentalist and non-
mentalist theories of social cognition is likely driven by highly theoretical,
background assumptions; so, it is unlikely that results from a relatively nar-
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row experimental paradigm will conclusively favor either interpretation of
infant socio-cognitive competence.
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